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Introduction
The European Commission (2007) views the completion of an integrated European energy market essential for ensuring competitiveness, sustainability and security of energy supply in Europe.
Market integration depends crucially on the transmission network connecting the member states being capable of reliably transporting energy from power plants in one country to consumers in another. Increasing shares of solar and wind energy place additional requirements on the grid as production and energy ‡ows become more volatile. The transmission network is a natural monopoly because it is too expensive to build competing networks. Absent a competitive pressure, establishing and maintaining an e¢ cient multi-national transmission network boils down to implementing optimal multi-national regulatory policies.
Most liberalized electricity markets have been deregulated one country at a time. Owing to the national scope of liberalization, also transmission regulation has been national in scope whereby national regulatory agencies govern national system operators responsible for managing the national transmission networks. The question is whether this national transmission governance structure is optimal any longer in a multi-national energy market. 1 In a multi-national energy market, improvements in grid capacity at home creates externalities abroad because energy ‡ows and prices change across the entire market with the removal of each transmission bottleneck. With too narrow a focus on domestic e¤ects, national regulatory agencies run the risk of ignoring the externalities abroad when devising regulatory policy for the national system operator.
Two examples from the Nordic electricity market illustrate the cross-border externalities of transmission capacity. The Nordic electricity market was the world's …rst multi-national liberalized electricity market and now spans Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In the spring of 2008, main transmission lines connecting southern Norway and southern Sweden broke down on the Norwegian side, severely limiting export capacity to Sweden. One year later the connections were still not back to full capacity. According to the Norwegian regulator, the break downs were largely due to insu¢ cient maintenance by the Norwegian system operator, Statnett. Admitting that the repairs were taking an unusually long time, Statnett emphasized that the security of supply for Norwegian consumers was never jeopardized. Meanwhile, the consumers in southern Norway had been enjoying comparatively lower electricity prices. The e¤ects on consumers and producers in Sweden (or elsewhere) seem to have been absent from the Norwegian discussion.
In the spring of 2009, the European Commission opened proceedings against the Swedish system operator, Svenska Kraftnät, for the abuse of its dominant position as the sole provider of Swedish transmission capacity. The allegation was that Svenska Kraftnät limited exports to Denmark to alleviate domestic congestion problems stemming from excess demand in southern Sweden. By cutting the out ‡ow of electricity, Svenska Kraftnät was able to export price increases from southern Sweden to Denmark thereby achieving the goal of a uniform electricity price throughout Sweden. Denmark complained that Svenska Kraftnät did not take into account the costs to the Danish consumers of the export limitations.
With the cross-border externalities in mind, would it not be better to establish a common regulatory agency responsible for the entire transmission network? Should the national system operators be merged into a single common system operator? This paper analyzes these horizontal aspects of optimal transmission network structure. The discussion of network structure has so far centered around the costs and bene…ts of vertical separation of transmission operation from production; see e.g. Cremer et al. (2006) for an analysis and Pollitt (2008) for an account of the arguments. For the fear that integrated utilities will discriminate against competitors and invest inadequately in their networks, the EU recommends full ownership unbundling of transmission and production assets (EU, 2009b) . However important vertical structure may be, overall network performance depends crucially on the incentives induced by the regulatory policies adopted by the di¤erent member states, which is precisely the topic of this paper.
The establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER, and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, ENTSO, bears witness to the importance EU policy makers attach to cross-border coordination of regulatory policies and system operation.
I consider a two-country energy market with interconnected networks. Network reliability increases with maintenance spending in both networks. Gains from energy trade render network reliability valuable. The scope of regulation is to provide the system operator(s) with the appropriate incentives for network maintenance while minimizing maintenance cost and operator rent. First-best optimal spending occurs at the point at which the marginal bene…t of network reliability equals the marginal social maintenance cost.
Two complications render network structure important for network performance. First, because the gains from energy market integration vary across countries, the member states di¤er in their valuation of network reliability. These asymmetries are not likely to vanish with the introduction of a common regulatory agency (CRA). The desirability of establishing a single regulator depends on how well these di¤erences are reconciled within the CRA. Second, an informational asymmetry is the source of an agency problem between the regulator(s) and the system operator(s). The regulator has insu¢ cient information to assess whether network performance is inferior for exogenous reasons (low productivity) or endogenous reasons (insu¢ cient maintenance). By understating the productivity of the network, a system operator can secure itself excessive transfers relative to the cost of maintaining the network. The nature of this agency problem depends on how system operation is organized.
As optimal network structure is both a question of how many regulators and how many system operators there should be, a number of potential network structures need to be compared against one another. The Nordic electricity market exempli…es the governance structure labelled Separation in Table 1 : Every member state has its own national system operator (NSO) regulated by a national regulatory agency (NRA). An advocated contender is Integration whereby the responsibility for managing the entire transmission grid lies upon a common system operator (CSO). A common regulatory agency (CRA) governs the CSO. Common regulation constitutes a compromise between Separation and Integration and features a set of NSOs jointly regulated by a CRA. To complete the picture, Common agency describes a situation whereby multiple national regulatory agencies independently regulate a single CSO. Although relevant in other regulated sectors such as telecommunications, Common agency does not appear to be a likely network transmission structure. Discussions of the merits of having a single system operator seem to implicitly assume a complementary coordination of regulatory policies. For example, an investigation of the desirability of a Nordic system operator concluded that national governments should then have to relinquish some (regulatory) autonomy, else interference from the national governments would create ine¢ ciencies in system operation (EMG, 2008) . I therefore skip a detailed analysis of Common agency at this stage, although one might want to consider it for the sake of completeness.
National regulatory agencies Common regulatory agency National system operators Separation Common regulation Common system operator Common agency Integration Under Separation, the two national regulatory agencies (NRAs) play a non-cooperative game against each other whereby each NRA chooses its regulatory policy to maximize national welfare given the choice of policy by the other NRA. This lack of policy coordination creates two distortions. Internalizing only the domestic gains from market integration, the NRAs provide their national system operators (NSOs) insu¢ cient incentives for network maintenance. As a consequence, overall network reliability is too low under Separation. Second, the NSO in the country with the highest gains from trade spends too much on maintenance relative to the other NSO. This productive ine¢ ciency arises whenever the perceived marginal bene…t of network reliability di¤ers across countries. Asymmetric information further exacerbates maintenance under-spending. Suppose an NRA wants to induce increased maintenance spending of its NSO whenever the national network is of low productivity. Due to asymmetric information between the NRA and the NSO about true productivity, the NRA cannot target spending directly towards the low-productivity network, but is forced to compensate the NSO even if the network actually is in a good shape. This spill-over e¤ect, or informational rent, yields a virtual marginal maintenance cost in excess of the marginal social maintenance cost, which distorts maintenance spending in low productivity networks even further.
Establishing a common regulatory agency (CRA) takes care of the productive ine¢ ciency because maintenance spending now is optimally coordinated across the network. However, the distortions in aggregate maintenance spending do not necessarily vanish with the abolishment of national regulatory agencies. Instead, the distortions may be accentuated. Assume, for
example, that most of the gains from market integration fall upon one of the countries, whereas the country with the least to gain from integration holds decisive control over the CRA. The CRA then understates the marginal bene…t of network reliability, providing the system operator(s) insu¢ cient maintenance incentives. In this case, network reliability is so low that Separation welfare dominates Common regulation and Integration despite the productive ine¢ ciencies under Separation. The key to establishing a well-functioning common regulatory agency is to ensure a balanced political in ‡uence across the member states. With an equal distribution of political power, no member state can exert enough in ‡uence over the regulatory policy to tilt it in one's own favour: Aggregate spending is near the social optimum, and Common regulation welfare dominates Separation.
How to organize system operation depends crucially on the characteristics of the transmission network and on the social cost of operator rent. Consider the case with two NSOs. Under the assumption of network complementarity, the marginal value of maintenance spending in one part of the network is higher, the higher is productivity in the other part of the network. Under network complementarity, the home NSO exerts a negative informational rent externality on the foreign NSO by understating the productivity of its network. The perceived marginal value of maintenance spending abroad then is understated, and the informational rent of the foreign NSO falls because informational rent is an increasing function of maintenance spending. By merging system operation into a single CSO, the regulator forces the system operators to internalize the negative rent externality through cross-subsidization, thereby reducing overall informational rent.
The superior ability of the CSO to jointly understate productivity of the entire network adds to the virtual marginal maintenance cost of low productivity networks under Integration. This extra maintenance cost tends to depress optimal maintenance spending below the optimal level under Common regulation for the case when both national networks are of low productivity. The downward incentive distortion is weaker the lower is the social cost of operator rent. However, under network substitutability, low productivity in one part of the network raises the marginal value of maintenance spending in the other part of the network. This substitution e¤ect pulls in favour of higher maintenance spending. The substitution e¤ect dominates the cost e¤ect whenever the social cost of operator rent is low. In this case, a CSO understating productivity in one part of its network exerts a positive informational rent externality on the other part of the network. In the presence of positive informational rent externalities, the regulator optimally splits system operation between a set of national system operators to mitigate the exercise of agency power.
Speci…cally, this paper contributes to the understanding of network regulation in multinational energy markets by studying the costs and bene…ts of centralized regulation and of merging system operation. This is the …rst integrated study of these horizontal aspects of network regulation, as far as I know. The focus has so far been on vertical separation of transmission and production.
More generally, I contribute to the literature on multi-contracting. Multi-contracting describes a situation where one or more principals contract with one or more agents. The present paper addresses the normative aspect of multi-contracting by analyzing the socially optimal contract structure. In a uni…ed framework, I study the welfare implications of changing the number of principals (regulators) as well as the number of agents (system operators). The ex-5 isting literature is more partial in considering either the optimal number of agents assuming a single principal (see Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for a survey), or analyzing the optimal number of principals assuming a single agent (see Martimort (2007) for a survey of such common agency models). The …nding that more principals as well as more agents sometimes are better than a single principal and a single agent vindicates a broader perspective. In the present model, Separation welfare dominates Integration whenever a country with little to gain from market integration would possess a dominating in ‡uence over the common regulatory agency and there are positive informational rent externalities.
A benevolent common regulatory agency which can commit to complete long-term contracts can always replicate any contracts implemented by the national regulatory agencies and can potentially do better. Centralized regulation is always optimal in this case. Conversely, decentralized regulation can be optimal only if (i ) the CRA is not benevolent; (ii ) has commitment problems or (iii ) there are problems of contractual incompleteness at the centralized level. The present paper explores the …rst, political economy motive by allowing individual countries to exercise political in ‡uence over the common regulatory agency. 2 The basic trade-o¤ between centralized and decentralized regulation in this setting is between internalizing cross-border externalities of network reliability versus tailoring regulatory policies to each individual country re ‡ecting di¤erences in how they value network reliability. This externality/bias trade-o¤ is classical in studies of political integration and dates back at least to Oates (1972) . Ellingsen (1998) early on noted how asymmetric gains from integration favoured decentralization, a result which also appears in the present context. The importance of political balance for the desirability of centralization has gone relatively unnoticed as far as I can see (although the result is straightforward) -possibly because most models assume majority voting. La¤ont and Pouyet (2003) is an exception. They study a model of multi-national procurement where political distortions arise from a tension between shareholders and non-shareholders. The centralized buyer places less weight on consumer surplus than …rm rent if shareholders are in majority, but cares nothing about …rm rent if shareholders are in minority. Opposite to this paper, centralized procurement welfare dominates decentralized procurement if and only if in ‡uence is asymmetrically distributed between shareholders and non-shareholders. This result can be traced to a peculiar speci…cation of the objective function of the centralized buyer in the model: Under shareholder majority the weight of consumer surplus is higher the larger is shareholder majority.
Consumer surplus and …rm rent have near equal weights in the limit when almost everybody is a shareholder, in which case the centralized buyer acts almost as the benevolent social planner.
A complicating factor in analysing political integration of regulation lies in characterizing the equilibria of the game played by independent regulators. A multi-principal Revelation Principle greatly facilitates the analysis of Separation in the present setting setting. Under the plausible assumption of transparent regulation, I can without loss of generality constrain attention to direct and incentive compatible regulatory contracts, and there is a unique equilibrium in the game with multiple principals and multiple agents. Under the standard assumption of "opaque" regulation, the set of equilibria could potentially be very large (Yamashita, 2010) , and the restriction to direct and incentive compatible contracts might come at a loss in generality (Attar et al., 2010) .
This paper emphasizes the role of informational rent externalities in determining the optimal number of system operators. Dana (1993) is the …rst to emphasize the importance of informational rent externalities for the optimal market structure of a regulated industry. He focuses exclusively on negative rent externalities as a motivation for granting monopoly rights.
Serevinov (2008) studies optimal organization of production in a model with a single principal and two agents. He shows that the optimal mode of organization (number of agents) depends on whether the value of information is superadditive or subadditive, which here corresponds to positive versus negative informational rent externalities. Serevinov (2008) establishes the link between the degree of substitutability/complementarity of inputs and additivity. The present paper extends Serevinov (2008) by studying also the optimal number of principals. It further complements his analysis by linking informational externalities to the social cost of informational rent.
The Model
Two countries, indexed by i 6 = j 2 f1; 2g, distribute energy through interconnected national transmission networks. The union of the two national networks de…nes the common network.
Interconnection enables energy trade between the two countries. Denote by S I i the sum of producer and consumer surplus in country i if the common network runs at full capacity, in which case the market is integrated, and by S A i if the common network operates at reduced capacity. Market integration is bene…cial to both countries, 4S i = S I i S A i > 0, i = 1; 2, but the gains from trade might be asymmetrically distributed: 4S 1 6 = 4S 2 in general. There are two reasons why both countries might bene…t from integration. Increased trade improves welfare in both countries under imperfect competition in both national markets. Second, improved network capacity leads to a better utilization of total generation capacity and therefore lower aggregate production costs. Both countries pro…t from integration if these cost reductions are evenly distributed across the countries. 3 Network reliability equals the probability P (q) that the common network runs at full capacity and depends on the quality q = (q 1 ; q 2 ) of the national networks. Network reliability is symmetric and an increasing and concave function of quality: P 0 i > 0, P 00 ii < 0, P 00 11 P 00
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P 00 12 P 00 21 for all q, where P 0 i = @P=@q i , P 00 ii = @ 2 P=@q 2 i and P 00 ij = @ 2 P=@q i @q j . Under network complementarity, marginal network reliability is increasing in the quality of the other part of the network: P 00 ij > 0 for all q. Conversely, marginal network reliability is decreasing in the quality of the other part of the network, P 00 ij < 0 for all q, under network substitutability. Network quality is the product of the exogenous productivity i 2 f ; g of network i and the resources m i 0 spent on maintaining network i: q i = i m i , i = 1; 2. I assume that the quality q i of network i is directly observable and contractible, but never its two components i and m i .
Productivity in network i is low ( i = > 0) with probability 1 v and high ( i = > ) with probability v. With this (common knowledge) stochastic structure, productivity = ( 1 ; 2 ) is stochastically independent across the two networks.
Depending on the network governance structure, either a common system operator (CSO) runs the entire common network or two national system operators (NSOs) run one national network each. Either way, the system operator receives a transfer t i for operating network i Ex post social welfare equals the expected gains from trade plus operator rent minus the social cost of transfers:
where > 0 is the shadow price of public funds and the same in both countries. Regulation here a¤ects the expected gains of trade only through its e¤ect on network reliability. see, e.g., Chapter 2 in La¤ont and Tirole (1993) for an analysis of the analogy between tax-based and user-based revenues.
The timing is as follows: Nature draws . NSO i learns i , but does not know more about j than the regulator(s). The CSO learns the entire productivity vector . The regulator(s) commit(s) to direct regulatory contract(s), which consist of a regulatory policy q i = (q i ; b q i ; e q i ; q i ) and a transfer policy t i = (t i ; b t i ; e t i ; t i ) for each network i = 1; 2. Upon observing the regulatory contracts (q 1 ; t 1 ) and (q 2 ; t 2 ), each NSO, alternatively the CSO, decides whether to accept the regulatory contract or refuse. 5 A system operator who turns down the contract receives reservation utility 0. If they both accept (I assume that this is always socially optimal), the regulated quality of network i is q i and the associated transfer to network i is t i if both networks report high productivity and q i versus t i if they both report low productivity. In case of dissimilar productivity reports ( i = > = j ), the quality/transfer pair equals (b q i ; b t i ) to the high 4 The model is cast in terms of network reliability and maintenance spending. An alternative interpretation would be to view P as overall network capacity, mi as real capacity investment in network i, i as productivity and ( ) as the (unobservable) capital cost. 5 Contracting is under asymmetric information with the timing of this model. It is always debatable whether the regulated …rm has all relevant information about its own productivity at the contracting stage. However, it is probably realistic to assume that …rms can shut down their production at any point if it becomes unpro…table. With an interim participation constraint, the analysis is similar to the one presented here. 8 productivity network and (e q j ; e t j ) to the low productivity network. Regulation is transparent:
The set of regulatory contracts as well as the productivity reports of the NSOs are common knowledge. Transparency simpli…es the analysis and allows me to emphasize the welfare e¤ects associated with di¤erent network structures, thus eliminating e¤ects stemming from ad hoc restrictions on the set of enforceable contracts. Moreover, the transparency assumption is realistic in this setting. The European Commission (2007), for example, views transparency essential for a properly working market. I do not study the welfare e¤ects of transparency here, but see Combes et al. (1997) Using m i = q i = i and t i = u i + (m i ), I can write expected national welfare in country i = 1; 2 entirely in terms of quality Q = (q 1 ; q 2 ) and operator rent u i = (u i ; b u i ; e u i ; u i ):
(1)
Equilibrium policies
To highlight the importance of network structure, I evaluate expected welfare and the optimal policies under the various structures against the …rst-best, complete information solution. Under complete information about productivity and for any regulatory policy, it is optimal to set operator rent as low as possible since transfers bear with them a social cost. System operation is voluntary. With an outside option equal to zero, the minimal transfers are at the point at which system operation is just pro…table: u 1 = u 2 = 0. To ensure the existence of an optimum, I employ a boundary condition:
throughout the analysis. This boundary condition is satis…ed if the marginal maintenance cost goes to in…nity or if marginal network reliability goes to zero as maintenance spending goes to in…nity. Straightforward maximization of aggregate welfare W 1 (Q; 0) + W 2 (Q; 0) over Q yields:
The …rst-best policy is unique and symmetric, q f b
and characterized by:
Under quality complementarity,
The proof is in the Appendix.
The …rst-best policy arises at the point at which the marginal bene…t of network reliability equals the marginal social maintenance cost. Network reliability is a public good: The value of network reliability depends on the aggregate gains from trade. Therefore, the optimal policy is symmetric, although the gains from energy market integration may be asymmetrically distributed across countries (4S 1 6 = 4S 2 ). The optimal distribution of maintenance spending across the network occurs at the point at which the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of technical substitution. In a network with asymmetric productivity ( 1 = > = 2 ):
which is independent of the aggregate gains from trade.
Quality varies less with productivity across the networks when network qualities are complements rather than substitutes. Under complementarity a productivity increase leads to higher quality in all parts of the network. Under substitutability, higher quality in one part of the network leads to lower quality in the other.
From an inspection of the conditions for optimal network quality, one might be tempted to conclude that higher gains from trade would always yield more network maintenance. This is not necessarily true. Under quality substitutability, more maintenance in one part of the network has the e¤ect of depressing the marginal bene…t of maintenance in the other. In principle, this substitution e¤ect could dominate the direct "income" e¤ect, rendering network quality an inferior good. In this paper I restrict attention to the case where network quality is a normal good, in the sense that an increase in the aggregate gains from trade leads to higher maintenance spending in all parts of the network under …rst-best regulation. A su¢ cient condition on network reliability is (stated here without proof):
If the degree of substitutability between q i and q j is su¢ ciently weak, the direct e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect. Condition (NG) is not particularly restrictive: It is satis…ed under quality complementarity (P 00 ij > 0) and even under perfect substitutability (P (q) = p(q 1 + q 2 )). Under complete information it does not matter whether there is a common system operator (CSO) or two national system operators (NSOs). In this model, a CSO spending m 1 and m 2 on maintenance in the two parts of the networks incurs the same maintenance cost (m 1 ) + (m 2 )
as two NSOs spending m 1 and m 2 in their respective networks. Maintenance economies of scale would favour the creation of a single CSO under complete information, whereas two NSOs would be better under diseconomies of scale. The present paper emphasizes the e¤ects of political constraints and incentives on optimal network structure. Therefore, I have not signed cost advantages in any direction.
Separation
Under Separation, a national regulatory agency (NRA) in each country has the responsibility for regulating the performance of a national system operator (NSO). I restrict attention to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) contracts; no NSO can strictly bene…t from misrepresenting its productivity nor shutting down no matter what the other NSO reports. Under dominant strategy implementation regulatory policies are robust to collusive coordination among the NSOs and to any misconceptions each system operator might have about the actions of the other. Owing to transparency, a multi-principal Revelation Principle applies to this analysis: Every equilibrium of a regulation game with a more general message space, can equivalently be represented as the equilibrium of a game where both regulators have committed to o¤ering direct DSID mechanisms; see the Appendix. 6 By transparency, NRA i can condition the regulatory policy on the productivity reports of both NSOs. Notwithstanding stochastic independence of information, NRA i still bene…ts from conditioning regulation on both reports because network reliability depends on quality in all parts of the network. Any contract accepted by the NSO in country i = 1; 2 must …rst satisfy the participation constraint
whereby it is required that system operation always be pro…table no matter the system operator's own productivity and its subjective belief about the productivity report of the other. The …rst requirement of incentive compatibility is that the high productivity NSO in country i = 1; 2 cannot bene…t from understating productivity independently of its beliefs about the productivity report of the NSO in country j:
The high productivity NSO can always secure itself a positive rent by understating productivity, as it must spend comparatively little, q i = versus q i = , on maintenance to reach a given level q i of quality. The value of this advantage is precisely the cost di¤erential (q i ) above.
To preserve incentive compatibility, NRA i must compensate NSO i this informational rent.
The informational rent is increasing in the regulated quality of the low productivity network owing to decreasing returns to maintenance spending ( 00 > 0, 000 0): is increasing and convex ( 0 (0) = 0, 00 > 0). The second requirement of incentive compatibility is that the low productivity NSO is always better o¤ reporting the truth than overstating productivity to :
The dishonest low productivity NSO is worse o¤ than the honest high productivity NSO due to the former type's competitive disadvantage of delivering quality.
The regulator in country i chooses the policy (q i ; u i ) to maximize expected national welfare W i (Q; u i ) subject to the above participation and incentive constraints, taking the policy (q j ; u j )
in the other country as given. The contracts (q S 1 ; u S 1 ) and (q S 2 ; u S 2 ) constitute a Nash Equilibrium under Separation if each contract is DSID and no regulator can raise national welfare by a unilateral deviation to another DSID contract. By standard arguments, see e.g. Chapter 1
in La¤ont and Tirole (1993) , the DSID constraints can be replaced by a binding participation constraint for the low type (e u i = u i = 0), binding downward incentive constraints (IC S ), and the monotonicity constraint
The regulator wants to minimize operator rent due to the shadow price of public funds. It is the high productivity NSO that must be compensated for revealing its type, because this NSO has the most to gain from lying. It is unnecessary to leave any rent to the low productivity NSO because it cannot bene…t from lying about its type. Substituting u i = ( (e q i ); (q i ); 0; 0) into (1), I can write national welfare under Separation entirely in terms of quality Q:
Maximization of W S i (Q) subject to q i e q i and b q i q i yields:
Lemma 2 There exists a unique equilibrium Q S = (q S 1 ; q S 2 ) under Separation (for generic parameter values), where
) is characterized by
and analogously for q S 2 = (q S 2 ; b q S 2 ; e q S 2 ; q S 2 ). Network reliability is too low relative to the …rst-best policy if network quality is a normal good (condition (NG) holds), but the country with the largest gains from energy market integration spends too much on maintenance relative to the other.
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The equilibrium policies q S 1 and q S 2 deviate from the …rst-best solution q f b in three respects, two of which have to do with the non-cooperative manner in which the regulatory policies are set under Separation. Network reliability is a public good. By failing to take into account the positive externality of increased network reliability, the national regulatory agency spends too little on maintenance: The full marginal e¤ect is P 0 i (q)(4S 1 + 4S 2 ), whereas NRA i only cares about P 0 i (q)4S i . Second, the regulatory policies su¤er from productive ine¢ ciencies. The distribution of maintenance spending is given by
when the two networks are asymmetric ( 1 = > 2 = ). With asymmetric gains from trade (say, 4S 1 > 4S 2 ), the high-productivity network tends to spend comparatively much on maintenance because the perceived relative marginal bene…t of network reliability is too high.
Third, maintenance under-spending is exacerbated by the presence of asymmetric information. Suppose the regulator wants to increase maintenance spending in the low productivity NSO, e.g. raise e q i marginally. To preserve the pro…tability of system operation the regulator must increase the transfers to the low productivity NSOs in proportion to the extra maintenance cost. Since transfers are costly, the marginal social maintenance cost is (1+ ) 0 (e q i = )= . Under asymmetric information, all types of NSOs bene…t from more high-powered incentives because the regulator cannot ex ante target transfers to low productivity NSOs. To preserve incentive compatibility, the regulator must compensate also the high productivity NSO by awarding it additional transfers. This spill-over e¤ect, the informational rent, leads to a virtual marginal maintenance cost
in excess of the marginal social maintenance cost. Under asymmetric information, optimal maintenance spending is found at the point at which the marginal bene…t of network reliability equals the virtual marginal maintenance cost. The higher is the shadow price of public funds, the higher is the probability v that the NSO is of a high productivity and the stronger is the cost advantage of the high productivity NSO (the higher is 0 ), the higher is the virtual marginal maintenance cost and the lower is equilibrium maintenance spending. Brainard and Martimort (1996) analyse a multi-principal, multi-agent game with some similarities to the game above. In a game of strategic trade policy under asymmetric information, each government o¤ers the home …rm a production subsidy to compete with an equally subsidized foreign …rm in a third country market. Under the assumption that each government maximizes the domestic …rm's rent (less the social cost of the subsidy), production subsidies are excessive because product market competition locks the two governments in a prisoner's dilemma. Asymmetric information serves to reduce policy distortions by increasing the virtual marginal cost of 13 production subsidies. In the present context, the fundamental coordination problem stems from free riding on a public good (network reliability), not competition. The focus is on aggregate welfare (including consumer's surplus) and not on …rm rent. Consequently, production subsidies are too small, and asymmetric information only adds to the problem. Brainard and Martimort (1996) restrict attention to the symmetric case and therefore do not address productive ine¢ ciencies stemming from asymmetric gains from trade. 7 Finally, a multiplicity of equilibria complicates their welfare analysis, whereas the present model yields a unique equilibrium.
Common regulation
Asymmetric gains from energy market integration (4S 1 6 = 4S 2 ) imply that the two national regulatory agencies (NRAs) choose di¤erent policies under Separation (q S 1 6 = q S 2 ). Under Common regulation, the regulatory responsibility is collected in the hands of a common regulatory agency (CRA). Yet, con ‡ict over the optimal regulatory policy is not likely to vanish with the introduction of a common regulatory agency if the asymmetric gains from trade remain also under Common regulation. The desirability of Common regulation then depends on how the preferences of the di¤erent countries are aligned within the CRA. The simplest way of introducing political con ‡ict is to assume that the CRA maximizes a weighted average of national
A relevant special case of this representation is majority voting whereby whoever holds the majority in the board of directors, exercises dictatorial powers over the design the regulation
This seemingly innocuous representation carries the seeds of severe political exploitation.
The common regulatory agency has the powers to tax the inhabitants in both countries to …nance system operation. Under simple majority rule, the CRA tailors its policy to maximize welfare W i (Q; u i ) in the majority country i, independently of the consequences for welfare in the minority country j. With a perceived shadow price of public funds equal to zero in country j, the CRA would pro…t from collecting excessive transfers from country j to …nance NSO i's system operation. A proportionality rule would curb such transfer exploitation. Under proportionality transfers should stand in relation to the cost of system operation in the country where they are collected. Proportionality is not enough, however. Under simple majority rule, the majority still has an incentive to overinvest in the minority network and …nance it by means of local transfers. Increased network reliability bene…ts the majority, but the perceived shadow price on transfers is minimal (@W i =@q j > 0). This problem of excessive network investment is relieved by the imposition of a non-discrimination rule whereby maintenance spending is required to be a function only of the productivity of the networks and not allowed to depend on the country in which the network is located. In the present setting, non-discrimination implies symmetric regulatory policies: q 1 = q 2 = q = (q; b q; e q; q) and u 1 = u 2 = u = (u; b u; e u; u). Conversely, symmetry implies non-discrimination and proportionality. 8
Under proportionality and non-discrimination, the CRA sets q and u to maximize 1 W 1 (q; q; u)+ 2 W 2 (q; q; u) subject to the participation constraint
and incentive compatibility constraints
As under Separation, the relevant constraints are downward incentive compatibility (IC Cr ), low type participation (e u = u = 0) and monotonicity
Operator rent is minimized by extracting all surplus from the low type while paying the high type precisely the informational rent. Substituting u = ( (e q); (q); 0; 0) into the symmetric weighted welfare function I obtain the common regulatory agency's policy function
Maximizing Cr (q) over q and subject to q e q and byields:
Lemma 3 Under Common regulation, the unique symmetric optimal policy q Cr = (q Cr ; b q Cr ; e q Cr ; q Cr )
is characterized by
If network quality is a normal good, then quality increases the more weight is placed on the national welfare of country with the largest gains from trade (If condition (NG) holds and
Concentrating regulatory responsibility in the hands of a single regulatory agency gets rid of the productive ine¢ ciency because maintenance spending is now optimally distributed throughout the network. With asymmetric network productivity ( 1 = > 2 = ):
, which is independent of the distribution ( 1 ; 2 ) of political power. Establishing a common regulatory agency has no bearing on the agency problem. The incentive distortion persists, and the marginal rate of substitution equals the virtual marginal technical rate of substitution.
There could be over-or under-spending under Common regulation depending on the distribution of political power. If the gains from trade are asymmetrically distributed across the countries (4S i > 4S j ), the perceived marginal bene…t of network reliability under Common regulation is higher the more weight is placed on the country with the most to gain from integration and therefore maintenance spending is higher. Under simple majority rule ( i = 1)
there will be excessive maintenance spending even compared to the …rst-best (q Cr > q f b ) if the social cost of transfers ( v) is low.
Integration
Under the framework of Integration, system operation is concentrated in the hands of a common system operator (CSO), regulated by a common regulatory agency (CRA). To emphasize the e¤ect of network structure, I assume sub-cost observability: The regulator observes and can contract on q 1 and q 2 separately even when there is a single system operator. If the regulator could observe and contract upon only a composite function of quality q, say network reliability P (q), Integration would be less appealing because of a narrower span of enforceable contracts.
I discuss the implications of sub-cost observability below; see also La¤ont and Tirole (1993) .
The regulatory problem under Integration is one of multi-dimensional asymmetric information. Any feasible contract must satisfy the participation constraint:
The restriction to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) contracts is without loss of generality here. Optimality of direct contracts follows from the Revelation Principle. Under Bayesiean implementation, the downward-binding incentive constraint is vu+(1 v)b u = v(e u+ (e q))+(1 v)(u+ (q)), the low type's participation constraint is ve u + (1 v)u = 0, and the monotonicity constraint is v (q) + (1 v) (b q) v (e q) + (1 v) (q). Substituting expected operator rent v (e q) + (1 v) (q) into the policy function and maximizing over q yields (8). The monotonicity constraint is satis…ed by this solution because q
Cr > e q Cr and b q Cr > q Cr . Hence, Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation yield exactly the same optimal policy; see Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) for more on this topic.
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and the incentive compatibility constraint
The CSO possesses an informational advantage over the two national system operators NSOs as the CSO (by assumption) holds private information about the productivity = ( 1 ; 2 ) of the entire grid. Unlike the two NSOs, the CSO is able to coordinate the performance of the various parts of the grid to maximize informational rent (recall, the regulatory policies are in dominating strategies under Common regulation): The CSO has more agency power than the two NSOs.
The advantage of having fewer system operators is cross-subsidization: It is only necessary to meet the aggregate pro…tability and incentive constraints of the CSO, and not one for each individual NSO. These costs and bene…ts will be more apparent later. As under Common regulation, political con ‡ict may yield incentives for transfer exploitation across countries. I therefore assume that contracts are required to be symmetric even under Integration.
Even here the main concern is the incentive of the CSO for understating the productivity of the network. Therefore, the feasibility constraints (P C I ) and (IC I ) can be replaced by the lowest type's participation constraint u = e u = 0, the downward-binding incentive compatibility
and the monotonicity constraint:
minfq; b qg maxfe q; qg.
Substituting the binding constraints into the policy function 1 W 1 (q; q; u) + 2 W 2 (q; q; u), the CRA's problem reduces to maximizing
over q and u, subject to 2u (q) + maxf (e q); (q)g and monotonicity (9):
Lemma 4 The optimal symmetric policy q I = (q I ; b q I ; e q I ; q I ), under Integration is characterized
where e I 0 and I 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with 2u I (q I ) + (e q I ) and 2u I 2 (q I ). If network quality is a normal good (condition (NG) holds), then P (b q I ; e q I ) > P (b q Cr ; e q Cr ), but P (q I ; q I ) < P (q Cr ; q Cr ).
Under Integration, coordination of maintenance spending yields productive e¢ ciency, same as under Common regulation. However, productive e¢ ciency depends on the ability of the NRA to contract on q 1 and q 2 , separately. Suppose instead that the NRA can only contract on network reliability p. This contractual incompleteness implies that the NRA is forced to delegate the distribution of maintenance spending to the CSO. If network productivity di¤ers across the network ( 1 = > = 2 ), the CSO's cost-minimizing choice of maintenance spending is characterized by:
Under delegation, the CSO fails to internalize the social cost of operator rent and therefore spends too much on maintenance in the low productivity part of the network compared to the second-best. Productive ine¢ ciency stemming from delegation would render Integration less appealing from a welfare point of view.
Di¤erences arise between Common regulation and Integration even absent any delegation problems under Integration. Under Common regulation, two system operators independently strive to maximize their rent. Under Integration, a single system operator exercises agency power. The ability to jointly understate the performance of the common network (report ( ; ) when the true type is ( ; )) jacks up the virtual marginal maintenance cost of the least productive network (of type ( ; )) and reduces the virtual marginal maintenance cost of intermediate The proof is in the Appendix.
With an equal distribution of political in ‡uence across countries, no member state can exert enough in ‡uence over the regulatory policy to tilt it in one's own favour. With political balance, the regulatory policy maximizes total welfare. Under simple majority voting, political balance is strongly biased: The median voter holds dictatorial powers over regulatory policy. If it so happens that the median voter is located in a country with small gains from market integration, the problem of inferior maintenance spending is so serious that productive ine¢ ciencies become of second order for network reliability. Maintaining multiple regulators then is better from a welfare perspective than creating a common regulatory agency.
What kind of political process could possibly lead to the creation of a common regulatory agency (CRA) whose policies would be to the detriment of individual member states? Obviously, if the policies of the common regulatory agency would be subject to unanimous approval by all countries, the regulatory policy under Common regulation would constitute a Pareto improvement. The CRA would then be maximizing a weighted average of national welfare subject to the political participation constraint, participation constraints or (ii ) whoever holds the veto right in each country pursues a di¤erent objective than national welfare maximization. The European Union constitutes an example of multi-national political cooperation with limited veto rights. Participation in the EU is voluntary, but the member states have delegated important policy decisions to EU authorities, energy policy being a prominent example. Note also that Proposition 1 has policy rami…cations also under voluntary participation. Even if the countries have agreed to a common regulatory agency, welfare is higher the more balanced is the political in ‡uence of the member states. 11 I have assumed proportional and non-discriminatory (symmetric) regulation as a means to curbing the problem of transfer exploitation. Yet, it appears not to have any real e¤ect here. If political power is perfectly balanced ( 1 = 2 = 1=2), the common regulatory agency maximizes aggregate welfare even with full discretion over transfers and incentives. However, the importance of proportionality and non-discrimination depends not only on the distribution ( 1 ; 2 ) of political in ‡uence, but also on the distribution (4S 1 ; 4S 2 ) of the gains from integration.
Assume that the gains from integration are symmetric, i.e. 4S 1 = 4S 2 = 4S. Then, the perceived marginal bene…t of integration equals
under symmetric regulation, which is completely independent of the distribution of political power. Under symmetric gains from trade and under the assumption of symmetric policies, welfare maximization results even under simple majority rule. Welfare maximization would not occur if the CRA could discriminate between the countries. Under simple majority rule ( i = 1), and for any domestic regulatory policy q i , the country in power would push maintenance spending abroad as high as possible (raise q j up to the point at which W j (Q; u j ) = W j (Q S ; u S j ) under voluntary participation) because the perceived social costs of transfers abroad is zero.
Symmetry arising from proportionality and non-discrimination forces the CRA to internalize parts of the social costs of transfers abroad. Under symmetric gains from integration, there is full internalization. La¤ont and Pouyet (2003) analyse the costs and bene…ts of decentralized policies in a multinational procurement model. Unlike in the present paper where voters are distinguished by the country they reside in (interjurisdictional heterogeneity), La¤ont and Pouyet (2003) assume that voters either are shareholders or non-shareholders (intrajurisdictional heterogeneity). Under centralized procurement the buyer places more weight on …rm rent than consumer surplus if shareholders are in overall majority, but cares nothing about …rm rent if shareholders are in overall minority. A main result is that centralized procurement welfare dominates decentralized procurement if and only if votes are asymmetrically distributed between shareholders and nonshareholders. This is the exact opposite of Proposition 1. La¤ont and Pouyet's (2003) result can be traced to a peculiar speci…cation of the objective function of the centralized buyer. Under shareholder majority, the weight of consumer surplus relative to …rm rent by assumption is higher the larger is shareholder majority. Consumer surplus and …rm rent have near equal weights in the limit when almost everybody is a shareholder, in which case the centralized buyer acts almost as the benevolent social planner.
Whether political con ‡ict in transmission regulation can best be described as "cross-border" or "cross-ownership" depends on who owns and manages the grid. With state-owned national system operators, as in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, it makes more sense to think in terms of cross-border con ‡icts because all citizens have identical stakes in the national …rm. Transmission regulation is more susceptible to political in ‡uence by shareholders in Finland where the system operator, Fingrid, is partially privately owned.
Common regulation versus Integration
The previous section analysed the costs and bene…ts of creating a common regulatory agency versus maintaining as structure of national regulatory agencies, holding …xed the structure of national system operators. This section instead analyses the costs of bene…ts of having a common system operator versus national system operators, …xing the regulatory structure. The question of whether a common system operator (CSO) is better than two national system operators (NSOs) is a question of whether the informational rent externalities are positive or negative under the di¤erent structures.
Assume that the common regulatory agency (CRA) wants to implement the symmetric policy q = (q; b q; e q; q), where q satis…es the monotonicity constraint maxfq; b qg minfe q; qg. The CRA can implement q both under a single CSO and when system operation is split between two
NSOs by applying an appropriate menu of transfers. 12 Expected network reliability and social maintenance costs are the same irrespective of how system operation is managed. The optimal structure of system operation then boils down to minimizing expected operator rent. Merging the two NSOs into a CSO is a cost e¢ cient way of implementing q if and only if
in which case the expected operator rent is lower with a CSO than two NSOs.
Merging system operation is pro…table if e q > q and unpro…table if e q < q. To understand this result, assume that both networks are of high productivity ( = f ; g). An understatement of productivity from to by NSO j a¤ects the regulatory policies of both NSOs owing to the interdependence of marginal network reliability. This informational rent externality equals (q) (e q) and is negative if e q > q, but positive if e q < q. Thus, merging system operation into a CSO is optimal whenever the informational rent externalities are negative, while splitting system operation between two NSOs is optimal under positive informational rent externalities.
The sign of the informational rent externalities depends crucially on whether the network displays complementarities or substitutability. The network externality is negative under com-1 2 The appropriate transfers to the CSO are 2t = 2 (q= )+ (q)+maxf (e q); (q)g, b t+ e t = (b q= )+ (e q= )+ (q) and 2t = 2 (q= ). The appropriate transfers to each NSO are t = (q= ) + (e q), b t = (b q= ) + (q), e t = (e q= ) and t I = (q= ).
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plementarity: Lower productivity in network i triggers a reduction in maintenance spending everywhere because the virtual marginal maintenance cost goes up in network i and the marginal bene…t of maintenance spending falls in network j. The rent externality is negative because informational rent is increasing in maintenance spending. By merging system operation into a single CSO, the regulatory agency forces the networks to internalize the negative rent externality by means of cross-subsidization:
Proposition 2 Assume that the network displays complementarities (P 00 ij > 0 for all q). Then, the common regulatory agency prefers a common system operator to two national system operators. If also political in ‡uence of the two countries is balanced ( 1 1=2), so that the common regulatory agency internalizes most of the gains from market integration, Integration welfare dominates both Common regulation and Separation.
Negative informational rent externalities under quality complementarity render Integration better than Common regulation from the regulator's point of view. The regulator acts as the benevolent social planner when political power is balanced. In that case, Integration is the socially optimal network structure. 13 Based on the above results, it might be tempting to draw the conclusion that network substitutability gives rise to positive network externalities. But this is not always true. Lower productivity in network i implies a reduction in optimal maintenance spending in network i under all network structures because the virtual marginal maintenance cost of network i is higher the lower is the productivity of that network. The quality reduction in network i tends to increase maintenance spending in network j under quality substitutability. However, the ability of the CSO to understate performance of the entire network drives up the virtual marginal maintenance cost for the lowest productivity network under Integration. A higher marginal cost tends to lower optimal maintenance spending in the lowest productivity network. If the social cost of informational rent ( v) is high, the cost e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect and so negative network externalities persist under Integration also under quality substitutability: e q I > q I . On the other hand, if the social cost of informational rent is low, Integration generates positive network externalities (q I > e q I ):
Proposition 3 Under network substitutability (P 00 ij < 0 for all q) and if the social cost of informational rent ( v) is low, informational rent externalities are positive under Integration (e q I < q I ). The common regulatory agency then prefers to divide system operation between two national system operators instead of having a common system operator. If also network quality is a normal good and political in ‡uence of the two countries is balanced ( 1 1=2), Common regulation welfare dominates Integration as well as Separation.
The common system operator internalizes the positive rent externality by coordinating performance in all parts of the network. This exercise of agency power drives up the informational rent under Integration. The common regulatory agency mitigates agency power by splitting system operation among a set of national system operators and setting up a dominant strategy incentive structure.
The costs and bene…ts of having a common system operator (CSO) versus maintaining two national system operators (NSOs) resemble the costs and bene…ts of monopoly versus duopoly in an unregulated market. The monopoly exercises more market power than the duopoly. Yet, monopoly is better provided the monopoly exhibits su¢ cient cost synergies to o¤set the negative e¤ects of market power. Owing to its monopoly on information about network productivity, the CSO exercises more agency power than two separate NSOs. Nonetheless, a CSO is optimal provided the cost synergies arising from merging system operation are strong enough. In the present context, these cost synergies stem from cross-subsidization. With a single system operator, the regulator has to worry about aggregate incentives, whereas the incentive and participation constraints of each NSO constrain the set of feasible regulatory policies when there are more than one system operator. Dana (1993) is the …rst to emphasize the importance of informational rent externalities for the optimal market structure of a regulated industry. Dana exclusively focuses on negative rent externalities as a motivation for granting monopoly rights and labeled them informational economies of scope (in the present context, the equivalent of Dana's assumption would be independence: P 12 = P 21 = 0 for all q). Positive rent externalities would correspond to informational diseconomies of scope.
Serevinov (2008) studies optimal organization of production in a model with a single principal and two agents. He shows that the optimal mode of organization depends on whether the value of information is superadditive or subadditive, which here corresponds to positive versus negative informational rent externalities. In his analysis Serevinov (2008) establishes the link between the degree of substitutability/complementarity of inputs and additivity. Information is subadditive if inputs are weak complements or weak substitutes (i.e. in the present context, the condition is jP ij j=jP ii j < z for all q and some 0 < z 1) and it is superadditive if inputs are asymmetric and inputs are strong complements or substitutes. 14 The present paper extends Serevinov (2008) by studying also the optimal number of principals. It complements his analysis by bringing out the link between informational externalities and the social cost of informational rent. Quality substitutability alone tends to generate positive rent externalities, but the cost of informational rent pulls in the opposite direction. If the social cost is high, informational rent externalities are positive under the single-agent structure, and splitting system operation between two NSOs need not be optimal even under strong quality substitutability.
Conclusion
No network governance structure does uniformly better and no governance structure performs uniformly worse than all others in this model. Rather, optimal network structure depends on (i ) how well the common regulatory agency balances the interests of the di¤erent member states;
(ii ) how the gains from energy market integration vary across the member states; (iii ) the characteristics of the network (substitutability versus complementarity); (iv ) the social cost of operator rent.
Having a common regulatory agency is better from a welfare perspective than maintaining national regulatory agencies on the proviso that political in ‡uence is su¢ ciently balanced across the member states in the common regulatory agency. With an equal distribution of political power, no member state can exert enough in ‡uence over regulatory policy to tilt it in one's own favour. The importance of balanced political in ‡uence is well understood by the European With balanced political in ‡uence, the preferences of the regulator are aligned with those of the benevolent social planner. Under those conditions, a common system operator is socially optimal under network complementarity, whereas splitting network operation is socially optimal under network substitutability and provided the social cost of operator rent is not too high.
Whether a network displays complementarities or substitutability depends on network topology.
In a radial network, energy ‡ows from production node A to consumption node B through a sequence of interconnections, where the interconnector with the smallest capacity determines the capacity of the entire network. The radial network displays a high degree of complementarity because the value of expanding capacity in any single part of the network increases the higher is capacity in other parts of the network. In a meshed network, energy ‡ows from production node A to consumption node B through a …ne web of interconnected transmission lines. Any single interconnection is less important the higher is the capacity of alternative interconnections. The meshed network therefore displays a high degree of substitutability. I have conducted the analysis within a complete contracting framework. All necessary policy coordination takes place at the level of regulation under complete contracting: There is no role for delegating tasks to the system operator. While a …tting description of capacity regulation, the assumption that the regulator can contract on all contingencies regarding day-to-day system operation is unlikely to hold. Contractual incompleteness speaks in favour of establishing a common system operator to the extent multi-national energy markets require detailed coordination of cross-border system operation.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
By the boundary condition (BC) all possible maxima of W 1 (Q; 0) + W 2 (Q; 0) by necessity are contained in [0; k] 8 . Maximization of a continuous function on a compact set yields an optimum.
Concavity of P and strict convexity of render aggregate welfare strictly concave, hence the solution is unique. The solution is interior by the assumption that P 0 i (0; q j ) > 0 for all q j 0 and 0 (0) = 0. Symmetry of P , and render the solution symmetric. Thus, the …rst-order conditions (focs) given by (2) characterize the unique solution.
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i . By concavity of P and strict convexity of , the denominator is positive, so dq
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that both NRAs have committed to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) 25 contracts. Consider the Lagrangian
where i 0 and i 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with q i e q i and b q i q i , and i = ( i ; b i ; e i ; i ) 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with non-negative quality, q i 0. Concavity of P plus strict convexity of and render W S i strictly concave in q i . Strict concavity of W S i and linearity of the constraints render L S i strictly concave in q i . Thus, every solution (q S i ; S i ; S i ), S i , i = 1; 2, to the …rst-order conditions @L S i =@q i = 0 and associated complementary slackness conditions constitutes an equilibrium of this game.
of the game is a solution to the complementary problem:
Conversely, every solution to (12) characterizes an equilibrium of the game with i appropriately de…ned. Thus, there are exactly as many equilibria of the game as there are solutions to (12).
The mapping l is continuously di¤erentiable by the assumption that P 0 i , 0 and 0 are continuously di¤erentiable. Thus, (12) has a unique solution if (i ) every solution to (12) is element of a compact set; (ii ) l satis…es an appropriate regularity condition; and (iii ) the Jacobian of l, eliminating rows and columns with elements of zero, is positive at all solutions to (12); see Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) .
Condition (i ):
For all e q 1 > k > 0,
where the second inequality follows from (BC). By necessity, then, every solution to (12) satis…es
which is strictly positive by (BC) and 1 (q 1 e q 1 ) = 0. By necessity every solution to (12) satis…es even q 1 k. Suppose q 1 = 0. Then
by the assumptions that P 0 1 (0; q 2 ) > 0 for all q 2 0 and 0 (0) = 0. 
Thus, 1 0 is bounded from above. Analogously, 1 0 is bounded from above. Similarly, 2 is contained in a compact and convex set. This concludes the proof that every possible solution
to (12) is element of a compact (and convex) set.
Condition ( 
where I have used
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> 0.
Having established existence and uniqueness, I turn now to the comparative statics of the equilibrium contracts. Consider …rst the problem of overall under-spending (P (q S ) < P (q f b )).
The proof is in two steps. First, I consider under-spending as a failure to internalize trade externalities, ignoring the e¤ects of informational rent. I then show that informational rent adds an additional distortion under Separation. De…ne z f b ( ) as the implicit solution to P 0 
, which is of ambiguous sign. Total di¤erentiation of P (z f b ( )) yields after simpli…cation and using symmetry (P 00 ji = P 00 ij ):
, which is positive under condition (NG). Hence,
Consider next the e¤ect of informational rent. Di¤erentiate q S i with respect to v:
P 00 12 P 00 21 )4S 1 4S 2 (P 00 11 c 00 22 4S 1 + P 00 22 c 00 11 4S 2 ) + c 00 11 c 00
, which can be positive or negative. Total di¤erentiation of P (q S ) with respect to v yields after simpli…cation and using symmetry (P 00 ji = P 00 ij ):
.
Under condition (NG), dP (q S )=dv 0. Since
To see that NSO 1 overinvests relative to NSO 2 under Separation when 4S 1 > 4S 2 , …x aggregate quality at X and implicitly de…ne x 1 ( ) by
, where 2 [1;
Under the assumption of two NSOs, the second-best optimal distribu-tion of quality is (x 1 (1); x 2 (1)) because this is the point at which the marginal rate of substitution equals the (virtual) marginal technical rate of substitution, whereas (x 1 (4S 1 =4S 2 ); x 2 (4S 1 =4S 2 )) = (q S 1 ( ); q S 2 ( )). Di¤erentiate and substitute in = P 0 2 c 0 1 =c 0 2 P 0 1 to get
, which is strictly positive under condition (NG). Thus, 4S 1 > 4S 2 implies relative overinvestment in 1 (q S 1 ( ) > x 1 (1)) and under-spending in 2 (q S 2 ( ) < x 2 (1)) under Separation.
The relevance of dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) mechanisms under Separation
The restriction to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) mechanisms is without loss of generality in the sense that every dominant strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a regulation game with general message space (de…ned below), can equivalently be represented as the equilibrium of a game where both regulators have committed to o¤ering direct DSID mechanisms.
Consider a regulatory game with a general message space. Assume that each national regulatory agency (NRA) i = 1; 2 has committed to a message space A i , and a regulatory policy (q i ; t i ) : A ! R + R, where A = (A i ; A j ) (by the assumption of full transparency, the message space and regulatory polices are common knowledge). Let q = (q i ; q j ) and t = (t i ; t j ). Let a i ( i ) 2 A i be the message chosen by national system operator (NSO) i of type i 2 f ; g under the regulatory policy (q ; t ), and write a ( ) = (a i ( i ); a j ( j )). In a dominant strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the regulation game with general message space A, (q ; t ) and fa ( )g 2f ; g 2 satisfy for i 6 = j = 1; 2, every 2 f ; g 2 and for all a i ; a j 2 A i fa j ( ); a j ( )g:
Condition (14) states that messages are required to be dominant strategies in regards to all messages reached by the opponent with positive probability, i.e. a j ( ) and a j ( ), but does not require dominance in regards to the entire message space A j . Condition (15) states that participation should be pro…table in equilibrium. Stronger strategy requirements, like dominance regarding the entire message space A j , could be placed on the regulatory policies. These added restrictions would (weakly) limit the set of equilibrium policies. A further equilibrium requirement is that 29 there exists no (q i ; t i ) with corresponding messages fb a( )g 2f ; g 2 , where b a i ( i ) 2 A i is the message chosen by i of type i 2 f ; g under the regulatory policy (q i ; q j ; t i ; t j ), satisfying for i 6 = j = 1; 2, every 2 f ; g 2 and for all a i ; a j 2 A i fb a j ( ); b a j ( )g:
where Pr( ; ) = v 2 , etc. Conditions (16)- (18) state that there should exist no strictly pro…table dominant strategy implementable policy deviation (q i ; t i ) for i. Conditions (14)- (18) jointly de…ne a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (because out-of-equilibrium beliefs remain unspeci…ed).
Consider instead an alternative game in which both regulators commit to o¤ering DSID mechanisms. For i = 1; 2, let q S i ( ) = q i (a ( )) and t S i ( ) = t i (a ( )). It is easy to verify that (14) and (15) render truth-telling a (weakly) dominant strategy and participation pro…table in the direct mechanism. To show that (q S ; t S ) does constitute an equilibrium, I need to verify that i cannot pro…tably deviate from (q S i ; t S i ) to some other DSID policy (e q i ; e t i ) given (q S j ; t S j ). Suppose, on the contrary, that such a pro…table deviation (e q i ; e t i ) would exist. Return to the general message game, and de…ne an alternative regulatory policy (q i ; t i ):
Under the assumption that j does not alter its message strategy with the introduction of the alternative strategy (q i ; t i ), i.e. b a j ( ) = a j ( ) and b a j ( ) = a j ( ) holds, DSID of (e q i ; e t i ) implies that an NSO i of type i 2 f ; g earns a non-negative pro…t by reporting
and cannot bene…t from deviating to a i (b i ), where b i 2 f ; g and b i 6 = i . Deviating to
Given that j does not modify its message strategy under the new policy, it is not pro…table for i to alter its message strategy either. Since the regulatory policy (q j ; t j ) is the same as before, it is optimal for j to maintain its message strategy b a j ( j ) = a j ( j ) for all j 2 f ; g given that i does not alter its message strategy under the new policy. Hence, unaltered message strategies are mutually optimal, and therefore (q i ; t i ) satis…es (16) and (17). Moreover
where the equalities hold by construction of the regulatory policies (e q i ; e t i ) and (q S ; t S ), and the inequality follows from the assumption that a deviation to (e q i ; e t i ) is strictly pro…table.
The existence of a pro…table unilateral deviation contradicts the assumption that (q ; t ) is an equilibrium. Hence, if (q ; t ) is indeed an equilibrium, then there cannot exist any pro…table unilateral DSID deviation (e q i ; e t i ) from (q S i ; t S i ) and therefore (q S ; t S ) constitutes an equilibrium. The equilibrium policies and welfare are the same in both games, hence they are equivalent.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the unconstrained maximization of Cr (q). I verify ex post that the (unique) solution satis…es q Cr > 0, q Cr > e q Cr and b q Cr > q Cr . By the boundary condition (BC), all maxima of Cr by necessity are contained in [0; k] 4 . Maximization of a continuous function on a compact set yields an optimum. Concavity of P , strict convexity of and convexity of render Cr strictly concave, hence the optimum is unique and given by q Cr , characterized in (8). The solution is interior (q Cr > 0) by the assumption that P 0 1 (0; q 2 ) > 0 for all q 2 0 and 0 (0) = 0 (0) = 0.
Now to the monotonicity constraints.
Quality complementarity implies q Cr > b q Cr > e q Cr > q Cr : Recall the generalized virtual maintenance cost (13) and de…ne implicitly q Cr ( ) by Complementarity and e q Cr b q Cr imply P 0 1 (e q Cr ; e q Cr ) P 0 1 (e q Cr ; b q Cr ). Combining these inequalities I arrive at a contradiction: P 0 1 (e q Cr ; b q Cr ) > P 0 1 (b q Cr ; e q Cr ) P 0 1 (e q Cr ; e q Cr ) P 0 1 (e q Cr ; b q Cr ).
Thus, quality complementarity implies b q Cr > e q Cr .
Quality substitutability implies b q Cr > q Cr > q Cr > e q Cr : If P 00 ij < 0, then @q Cr i ( )=@ j < 0 and therefore b q Cr > q Cr and q Cr > e q Cr , see above. Finally, P 00 ij < 0 implies q Cr > q Cr . Subtract the foc for q Cr from the foc for q Cr in (8) and rearrange:
For q Cr q Cr , the right-hand side of the above expression is strictly positive because 00 > 0 and 0 > 0 for all q Cr > 0. Under quality substitutability, q Cr q Cr implies that the left-hand side is non-positive because dP 0 1 (q 1 ; q 1 ) = (P 00 11 (q 1 ; q 1 ) + P 00 12 (q 1 ; q 1 ))dq 1 < 0 -a contradiction. Thus, P 00 ij < 0 implies q Cr > q Cr . The …nal part is to show the e¤ect on network quality of increasing i . By straightforward di¤erentiation of q Cr ( ):
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, which is strictly positive if 4S i > 4S j and condition (NG) holds. A similar expression holds for dq Cr 2 =d i > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
Construct the Lagrangian
where e and are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with 2u I (q) + (e q) and 2u I 2 (q). Ignore for the moment the monotonicity constraint minfq; b qg maxfe q; qg and the nonnegativity constraint q 0. Concavity of I (q; u) and of both constraints imply concavity of L I (q; u). Hence, the …rst-order conditions and complementary slackness conditions characterized in (11) are necessary and su¢ cient for optimality of L I (q; u). By the boundary condition (BC), every solution to the problem of maximizing I (q; ( (q) + maxf (e q); (q)g)=2) is contained in
Maximization of a continuous function over a compact (and convex) domain yields an optimum. The solution is interior (q I > 0) by the assumptions that P 0 1 (0; q 2 ) > 0 for all q 2 0 and 0 (0) = 0 (0) = 0. To complete the existence proof, I verify the monotonicity constraint minfq I ; b q I g maxfe q I ; q I g.
Quality complementarity implies q I > b q I > e q I > q I : Assume that e q I > q I . Then, 2u I (q I ) + (e q I ) > 2 (q I ) and so
Plugging I = 0 and e I = v 2 into (11), it follows that z I i (1) = e q I , z I j (1) = b q I and z I i (0) = z I j (0) = q I . Straightforward di¤erentiation of z I ( ) yields dz I i =d > 0 and dz I j =d > 0 if P 00 ij > 0. So for P 00 ij > 0, e q I > q I is indeed consistent. The proofs that q I > b q I and b q I > e q I under quality complementarity are analogous the proofs in Lemma 3 that P 00 ij > 0 implies q Cr > b q Cr and b q Cr > e q Cr and are thus omitted.
Quality substitutability implies b q I > q I > maxfe q I ; q I g: The proofs that b q I > q I and q I > q I under quality substitutability are analogous to the proofs in Lemma 3 that P 00 ij < 0 implies b q Cr > q Cr and q Cr > q Cr and are thus omitted. The proof that q I > e q I under quality substitutability is analogous the proof in Lemma 2 that q S i > e q S i and is also omitted. The …nal part is to compare quality levels under Integration with quality levels under Common regulation. Moving from Common regulation to Integration is qualitatively the same as lowering the virtual marginal maintenance cost of the least productive network when the two networks di¤er in productivity. The di¤erence is ( v 2 + 2 I ) 0 (e q)=2v(1 v) > 0. Under quality complementarity, lower marginal cost in one part of the network translates into higher maintenance spending in the entire network. Thus, b q I > b q Cr and e q I > e q Cr in this case. A switch from Common regulation to Integration is qualitatively the same as raising the virtual marginal cost of both networks by the same factor when the two networks have the same low productivity.
The di¤erence is ( v 2 + 2 I ) 0 (q)=2(1 v) 2 > 0. Under quality complementarity, higher marginal costs in both parts of the network translate into lower maintenance spending in the entire network. Thus, q I < q Cr in this case.
Under quality substitutability, P 0 1 (q 1 ; q 1 ) is strictly decreasing in q 1 . Thus, q I q Cr would imply P 0 1 (q I ; q I ) P 0 1 (q Cr ; q Cr ). Convexity and the di¤erence in virtual marginal maintenance would yield P 0 1 (q I ; q I ) > P 0 1 (q Cr ; q Cr ) for q I q Cr , see the …rst-order conditions. This is a contradiction. Thus, q I < q Cr even under quality substitutability. The case when the two networks di¤er in productivity is more complicated. Again, e q I > e q Cr owing to a lower marginal cost under Integration. However, b q I < b q Cr due to quality substitutability. The overall e¤ect on network reliability is ambiguous, but under condition (NG), the direct e¤ect dominates and so P (b q I ; e q I ) > P (b q Cr ; e q Cr ); see the proof on Lemma 5 for an example of this type of result.
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall the de…nition of the generalized virtual maintenance cost c(q i ; i ) in (13). In the case of two national system operators, welfare is proportional to w(q) = P (q)(4S 1 + 4S 2 ) c(q 1 ; 1 ) c(q 2 ; 2 ) whenever the distribution of productivity is = ( 1 ; 2 ) . At , the welfare di¤erence between
Common regulation and Separation is proportional to w(q Cr ( ; i )) w(q S ( )). where I have substituted in the …rst-order condition c 0 i (q Cr i ; i ) = 2P 0 i (q Cr )( 1 4S 1 + 2 4S 2 ) (see the proof of Lemma 3) and simpli…ed. If condition (NG) holds (quality is a normal good), then dq Cr 1 =d i > 0 and dq Cr 2 =d i > 0 (Lemma 3) and so w(q Cr ( ; i )) w(q S ( )) is single-peaked in i with a unique optimum at i = 1=2. Clearly, w(q) reaches its maximum at q Cr ( ; 1=2) (because the …rst-order conditions under Common regulation then are identical to the ones under welfare maximization and the optimum is unique). Thus, w(q Cr ( ; 1=2)) > w(z S ( )), which together with single-peakedness proves the existence of 2 [0; 1=2) and 2 (1=2; 1] such that for all : w(q Cr ( ; i )) w(q S ( )) if and only if i 2 [ ; ] -with strict inequality in the interior.
I complete the proof by showing that Separation welfare dominates Common regulation and Integration for 2 = 1 and all 4S 2 low, but positive. For 2 = 1, q Cr ! 0 and q I ! 0 as 4S 2 ! 0 because the perceived gains from market integration then vanish. Thus, P i=1;2 W i (q Cr ; q Cr ; u Cr ) ! P (0; 0)4S 1 and P i=1;2 W i (q I ; q I ; u I ) ! P (0; 0)4S 1 as 4S 2 ! 0. Under Separation, q S 2 ! 0 as 4S 2 ! 0, but q S 1 ! q S 10 = (q S 10 ; q S 10 ; q S
10
; q S 10 ) > 0 as 4S 2 ! 0, where P 0 1 (q S 10 ; 0)4S 1 = c 0 1 (q S 10 ; ) and P 0 1 (q S
; 0)4S 1 = c 0 1 (q S
; ). The policy q S 10 is also the welfare maximizing choice of q 1 conditional on 4S 2 = 0 and q 2 = 0. Thus, P i=1;2 W i (Q S ; u S i ) ! W 1 ((q S 10 ; 0); u S 10 ) + W 2 ((q S 10 ; 0); 0) > P (0; 0)4S 1 as 4S 2 ! 0. By continuity, Separation welfare dominates Common regulation and Integration for 2 = 0 and all 4S 2 low, but positive. 
Proof of Proposition 2

Proof of Proposition 3
Quality substitutability implies b q I > q I > maxfe q I ; q I g, see the proof of Lemma 4. Both monotonicity constraints q I e q I and b q I q I are met, so the CRA can implement q I in dominating strategies under Common regulation by means of the transfers t = (q I = ) + (e q I ), b t = (b q I = ) + (q I ), e t = (e q I = ) and t = (q I = ). Weighted welfare equals
Cr (q Cr ) > Cr (q I ) = I (q I ; u I ) + v 2 ( (q I ) + maxf (e q I ); (q I )g 2 (e q I ))=2 T I (q I ; u I ).
The …rst inequality follows from uniqueness of q Cr 6 = q I under Common regulation. The last inequality is non-negative if q I e q I , in which case Common regulation is strictly better than Integration. It is negative if q I < e q I , and the welfare di¤erence between Integration and Common regulation then is ambiguous. I now show how the sign of q I e q I depends on the social cost v of informational rent.
If the social cost v of informational rent is low, then q I e q I . To prove this claim I only have to verify that q I > e q I is indeed consistent for low v because the …rst-order conditions are 35 necessary and su¢ cient. If q I > e q I , then 2u I 2 (q I ) > (q I ) + (e q I ) and by implication e I = 0 and I = v 2 =2. Plugging these Kuhn-Tucker multipliers into (11), yields 2P 0 1 (q I ; q I )( 1 4S 1 + 2 4S 2 ) = (1 + ) 0 (q I = )= 2P 0 1 (b q I ; e q I )( 1 4S 1 + 2 4S 2 ) = (1 + ) 0 (b q I = )= 2P 0 1 (e q I ; b q I )( 1 4S 1 + 2 4S 2 ) = (1 + ) 0 (e q I = )= 2P 0 1 (q I ; q I )( 1 4S 1 + 2 4S 2 ) = (1 + )( 0 (q I = )= + 1+ v (1 v) 2 0 (q I )).
For v = 0, it is easy to verify that q I > e q I by applying the same procedure used to prove , which is a contradiction. To understand the …rst, strict inequality note that P 0 1 (e q I ; b q I )=P 0 1 (q I ; q I ) is bounded away from zero because (e q I ; b q I ) 2 [0; k] 2 , q I 2 [0; k] and P 0 i is well de…ned for all q 0. Secondly, 0 (q i = ) < 0 (q i = ) for all q i > 0 and therefore lim q i !0 0 (q i = )= 0 (q i = ) 1 by continuity. Thus, the second term goes to zero as v ! 1. The second, weak inequality follows from the assumption that e q I q I , and the equality follows from the focs above.
The argument why Common regulation welfare dominates Integration and Separation if network quality is also a normal good and political in ‡uence of the two countries is balanced
( 1 1=2) is the same as why Integration welfare dominates Common regulation and Separation under quality complementarity; see the proof of Proposition 2.
